Electoral Democracy & Accountability

Electoral Democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a government to become genuinely accountable to its citizens. Discuss.

Good governance as promoted by the United Nations and World Bank (1997) in what is now referred to as the “Third Wave of Democracy” is now a highly contested subject. The new era of the democratizing agenda in which we find ourselves is concerned with examining and promoting forms of democratic governance (Huntington 1991). The delivery of good governance which subsumes genuine accountability as an essential function, may find resolution to the global problems of inequality and the absence of freedoms (Goetz and Jenkins 2001). We examine the role of electoral democracy in this context. “The expectations of millions of ordinary citizens” and their “long subordinated ideals of equality, participation, accountability, responsiveness and self realization” (Schmitter 1994) makes the need to examine mechanisms for delivery of accountability critical. The nature and exercise of power over increasingly scarce resources and its impact on global poverty and disparities must be addressed. Governance and its components thus form part of the contested space within which the new agenda operates.

This discussion is also informed by the need to examine exit strategies from deficiencies in what Luckham has referred to as “the paradigmatic character” of democracy (Luckham et al 2004).To attempt to develop a rigorous analysis of both genuine accountability and electoral democracy both concepts must be defined and placed in context.

Democracy

Democracy as an ideational construct can be defined as deriving from classical Athenian notions of rule (Xratos) by the people (demos). Luckham argues that it is a contested concept, borne of tensions between tyrannical elites and inequalities. “That is, it was democratic politics which produced democratic institutions. Yet at the same time the institutions most associated with modern democracy – free elections, political and civil rights protected under the rule of law and so on, were shaped through the efforts of dominant groups to regulate popular participation (Luckham et al 2004). Where historically industrialisation gave birth to liberal democratic formats, the second wave of democracy arose as part of the global decolonisation movement. The “Third Wave” however, ushered in by Portugal in 1974 is concerned with the implementation of sustainable solutions to globalisation (Huntingdon 1998). It is this age which has begun to question the fundamentals which were established in the preceding eras: the “age of democracy” itself.

Procedural and Substantive

There exists a plethora of further definitions surrounding democracy. Schumpeter’s seminal definition however, regarded democracy ‘an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote’. He divided it into two distinct concepts: procedural and substantive. Procedural democracy involves institutions and constitutions; ‘rules of the game’; citizenship and the ‘rule of law’; competitive elections and formal accountability mechanisms. Substantive democracy includes democratic behaviour and values, (‘democratic politics’); political and social equality seen as essential for ‘genuine’ democracy; popular empowerment and participatory democracy necessary to control power and inclusiveness or deepening democracy (Crook 2004). We are most concerned with Schumpeter’s procedural definition as it is frequently used in the examination of the contract between state and citizen. This helps formulate the basis of our discussion.

Electoral democracy as distinct from liberal democracy

This procedural definition was closely reiterated by Huntington who defined the electoral democratic political system by the fact that “it’s most powerful decision makers are selected through fair, honest, periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually the entire adult population is eligible to vote”. He goes further in that free, fair and competitive elections are only possible if there is some measure of freedom of speech, and press, and if opposition candidates and parties are able to criticize incumbents without fear of retaliation. These define “electoral democracy” as distinct from liberal democracy. In the latter, “restrictions on the power of the executive, independent judiciaries to uphold the rule of the law, protection for individual rights and liberties of expression, association, belief, and participation; consideration for the rights of minorities; limits on the ability of the party in power to bias the electoral process, effective guarantees against arbitrary arrest and police brutality; no censorship; and minimal government control of the media” (Huntington 1998) is also present. Here we are concerned with the pure form of electoral democracy test its immediate strength in providing accountability.

Using Huntington’s criteria, electoral democracies do not automatically guarantee the protection of minorities against the “tyranny of the majority” or that the rule of law be upheld. Huntingdon posits that whilst numbers electoral democracies are increasing, liberal democracies are remaining static. He draws attention to the “fallacy of electoralism” and the “free-elections trap” (Huntington 1998). These are perhaps crucial determinants in deciding whether or not electoral democracy is sufficient, necessary or even relevant as a guarantee of accountability.

Genuine accountability

We then come to the definition of one of the central tenets of good governance as outlined by the UNDP: that of genuine accountability. As a key to “achieving social justice, equity and a decent quality of life for the world’s poor”, accountability is a function of the relationship between stakeholders and those in power (Goetz and Jenkins 2002). Here gain our procedural view of democracy comes into play as we have two actors: “stakeholders” and “those in power”. A formal account of this relationship is needed.

“Accountability describes a relationship where A is accountable to B if A is obliged to explain and justify his actions to B, or if A may suffer sanctions if his conduct, or explanation for it, is found wanting by B. Accountability is thus a relationship of power. But it denotes a specific variety of power: the capacity to demand someone engage in reason-giving to justify her behaviour, and/or the capacity to impose a penalty for poor performance (ibid).

Two key distinctions emerge from this concept: “the first is the difference between the two key actors in the accountability drama: the ‘object’ of accountability, the one obliged to account for his actions and to face sanction, and the ‘agent’ of accountability, the one that is entitled to demand answers or impose punishments” (ibid). In this context, the elected falls under the category of ‘object’ via the electoral mandate, whilst the citizen, able to use the sanction of choosing to elect others into power, falls under the category of the ‘agent’.

The second distinction is concerned with two “basic forms of accountability: having to provide information about one’s actions and justifications for their correctness, and having to suffer penalties from those dissatisfied either with the actions themselves or with the rationale invoked too justify them. Theses aspects are sometimes called answerability and enforceability. They can also be thought of as weak and strong forms of accountability. Being accountable in the sense of having to explain one’s actions is a lot less onerous than being subject to sanction.” In practice, they go on to explain, “a system that provides for sanctions alone, without a formal process of reason-giving, can make judgements about either the validity of conduct or the appropriateness of sanction both less good and less fair” (ibid).

We are most concerned with the impact of sanctions arising from electoral democracies and its effectiveness in providing accountability. As will become clear, although electoral democracies have the potential to provide sanctions, the element of answerability or reason-giving is not immediately borne of the electoral mandate. The argument for genuine accountability lies in whether or not electoral democracies have the capacity to provide “information” or “justification for their correctness” and thus fit the criterion of “answerability” (ibid).

Also important is the difference between “de jure and de facto accountability: that is before the law or in the case of the latter, in actual practice. The analysis of this takes place within the discussion of the electoral mandate.

“Elections are the classic form of vertical accountability… [this is] the state being held to account by non-state agents.” Here I argue that vertical accountability: in which “citizens and their associations play direct roles in holding the powerful to account” can be ascribed to the function of the electoral mandate and thus the “enforceability” element of accountability (ibid).

We can go further and say that a second distinction: horizontal accountability”in which the holding to account is indirect, delegated to other powerful actors” more closely corresponds with the element of “answerability”. It is necessary to take this step as horizontal accountability relates to mechanisms and how they overlap within government: it “consists of the formal relationships within the state itself”. It does not necessarily bear direct influence over elections and the electoral system. Liberal and republican systems which can and do correspond to institutional overlap (where electoral systems are not necessarily configured to take this into account) can be ascribed to “answerability”. We will examine how this is possible in due course.

Another significant way of looking at accountability relates to ex post and ex ante accountability, where the elected’s actions are assessed after the fact (ex post) in the form of electoral sanctions (once again, “enforceability”) by citizens. Ex ante can thus correspond to “answerability”, where questioning takes place before the act i.e. where budgets are submitted for approval. These distinctions help “underscore the degree to which the frequency of scrutiny and public justification is an important variable affecting the capacity accountability systems to alter the incentives facing power holders” (ibid).

A final consideration is that of voice and accountability, which is referred to as “inseparable”. We must ask if citizens have access to the government in order to seek redress and accountability in the first instance. We must examine whether or not elite bargains, restraints placed upon competitors, ethnic, religious and linguistic elites, discrimination against women and many other forms of participation skewed by electoral systems preclude the possibility of effective voice for the many. In this, it is possible to demonstrate that electoral democracy cannot guarantee that all (not simply the majority of) “agents” are in possession of enough agency; so it is that their subsequent hopes for demanding accountability are frustrated. “For not only is voice used to interrogate power-holders for their decisions and actions, or to render a judgement on the need for sanction or the form it should take; the freedom to express opinions – the interplay of many voices – is the means by which societies collectively evolve the standards of justice and morality against which the actions of the powerful are to be held accountable” (ibid).

The electoral mandate as a function of enforceability

Is there a difference between accountability before the law or accepted procedure, (de jure) and accountability because of their practical power to invoke sanctions (de facto)? “In principle, of course, politicians are answerable to citizens. But in practice they are often more immediately concerned with the sanctions wielded by corporate interests, such as the withdrawal of campaign finance”. This “practical power” Goetz refers to is of immense interest in our discussion. The power of sanction is in itself reduced by various factors all of which diminish electoral democracies claim to be sufficient, if indeed necessary for genuine accountability. “Either way, the emphasis is on placing a check on the authority of the powerful, both because their actions affect those with relatively less power (who nevertheless possess certain rights) and because those who hold state power do so, implicitly or explicitly, in the name of people who constitute a political community” (ibid).

State power then, corresponds to the automatic assumption that it be subjected accountably to the voices of constituents who elected them. “Accountability is conventionally conceived as a way of providing citizens a means to control the behaviour of actors such as politicians and government officials to whom power has been delegated, whether through elections or some other means…. Government accountability –that is, the duty of public officials to report their actions to the citizens, and the right of the citizens to take action against those officials whose conduct the citizens consider unsatisfactory – is an essential element, perhaps the essential element, of democracy” (ibid).

The electoral mandate derives its legitimacy from being subjected to the voting citizenry i.e. whilst elected, governments are subjected to “sanction” or the enforceability component of accountability that has been explained. The sanction that voters can use is their vote: whether or not they decide to elect a regime into power. “Genuine electoral mandates confer legitimacy on governments and help to guarantee their credibility, as well as the stability and predictability of their policies. The alternatives to electoral legitimacy are various forms of authoritarianism. …. By definition, authoritarian governments lack accountability, and this affects the quality of governance. The alternative [i.e. South East Asia] is an exception (Agere 2000).

But this idea of sanction via the electoral mandate is clearly not sufficient: wherever the mandate is invoked, it is always coupled with “the constitutional state and the rule of law” (Luckham et al 2004) or various other forms of checks and balances. Electoral democratic regimes throughout the world do not necessarily have these features. As a result, we must also address the extent to which the effectiveness of the mandate is predicated upon other, often horizontal, mechanisms.

”Elections...occur periodically, and their effectiveness at securing vertical accountability is unclear, especially given the inchoate party systems, high voter and party volatility, poorly defined issues, and sudden policy reversals that prevail in most new polyarchies.” (O’Donnell 1998).

Luckham insists that “the inability of citizens to hold governments and political elites accountable for their use of power (weak vertical accountability) is a... crucial form of democracy deficit”. He argues that problems with the procedural content of electoral democracy may be the key factor. Voting systems and the distribution of power are among his concerns. “Or it may reflect weak societal support for democracy – citizens may have little effective choice between alternative political programmes; civil society may be weak and divided; or the power of dominant economic interests may be disproportionate.” (Luckham et al 2004). The sanction is again reduced if as he says, effective choice is restricted. Choice as to representation is one such variable: a key question perhaps is if the elected are not representative, is accountability mitigated?

Whilst we have indicated that one conditionality of accountability: “enforceability” may be present via the existence of the sanction, we have yet to find “answerability” located within the electoral democracy. What must be demonstrated more closely is the practical ability of the electoral mandate to draw out either “enforceability” or “answerability” or both. In either, we may find the propensity of electoral democracy for achieving accountability. We can also look further at what remains of electoral democracy and indeed whether or not it is even necessary to genuine accountability.

Elections themselves may be the route to power for parties or individuals that seriously threaten the “maintenance of democracy”. (Huntingdon) Our attention is drawn to the power of the elected to abrogate the constitution once actually in power. In practice this may mean being able to force through constitutional amendments which secure longer terms, which limit the elections and who may take part, the crowding out of competition or the de-legitimization of the scope of opposition. Democratic gains can be and are reversed or receded via constitutional regressions. This means that although the mandate seems legitimate, it often is not. A sanction applied to such a mandate would seem to be artificial. The problem in this instance then, is that electoral democracy does not even provide the mechanism for enforceability: i.e. the sanction is rendered ineffective. For example, in Zambia in 1995, “President Chiluba…proposed two constitutional amendments transparently designed to eliminate a challenge from his old nemesis. In this strategy, Chiluba was only following the example set by President Bedie of Cote d’Ivoire, who earlier had changed legal codes to prevent Alassane Ouatara…from being allowed to run.” It is evident here that the formal practice of electoral democracy is conflated with “neopatrimonial political practice” as “elected rulers have lapsed back into manipulating political rules in order to consolidate their personal hold on power” (Bratton et al 1997). The sanction of the vote in this instance is void as the election is not subject to “enforceability”.

As a concept then, electoral mandates do not necessarily carry with them much weight. The ability to derive answerability or even enforceability from such contexts becomes much more complex. If the elected can not be subjected to sanction, accountability is no longer present.

Electoral democracies as a function of answerability

We are concerned with the ability of electoral democracy to be representative even in its most austere manifestation. As we have already noted, if an elected regime is insufficiently representative, the scope for accountability vis-à-vis reason-giving is restricted from the off: “Governments are accountable if citizens can discern representative from unrepresentative governments and can sanction them appropriately …An “accountability mechanism” is thus a map from the outcomes of actions (including messages that explain these actions) of public officials to sanctions by citizens” (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999).

Elected candidates who derive power from limited mandates or constituent bases are not behoven to give due attention to answerability. “The well-known ‘democracy deficits’ of established Western democracies include under-representation of women, voting systems which skew electoral outcomes, majoritarian governments which ignore minority interests, non-accountable, non-transparent bureaucracies, and the diminished policy space available in globalised economies” (Luckham et al 2004).

“In its purely formal sense, citizenship vests in individuals the right to participate in electoral processes … But such a formulation does not conceive of participation as an ongoing process of discursive debate and real contestation. Citizenship both determines and is shapes by the political opportunities for citizens to gain access to the public sphere and hold governments and state elites accountable. This is clearly easier where there is broad consensus on the rules of politics, where it is not seen as a zero-sum game, and where it is not dominated by gender, racial or ethnic hierarchies. Government accountability not only depends on the organisation of the public sphere itself – how far there is open government, whether power is decentralised, and so on. Even more, it depends on the ability of citizens to insist upon accountability when governments resist it. This is normally facilitated by factors such as the existence of civil society groups, organised and internally democratic political parties, and robust traditions of local democracy” (ibid). Answerability here becomes less the product of election and more the product of sustained participation.

This is all the more so as Huntington argues that electoral democracies can exacerbate ethnic, religious or nationalist divisions within the polity as appeals to power are often made along such lines. There is little to mitigate such tendencies in electoral democratic systems. In Asian societies, he notes, electoral democracy “to the extent that it develops… is likely to be designed to produce consensus rather than choice, to have different characters from electoral democracy in the West, and to lack the penumbra of the liberal practices and institutions that go with Western democracy”. In China, for example, he notes that “political leaders are vigorously opposed to democracy, the emerging bourgeoisie is likely to be too intertwined with the state to challenge state power; and students and other dissidents lack any secure social base” (Huntington 1998).

Arguments revolving around PR and different types of voting systems as referred to by Luckham et al illustrate the extent to which a particular system may or may not reflect the needs of the polity and the scope for accountability is again limited. Agrarian societies function differently and the pluralist systems which attempt to take this into account still have failures. Proportional representation systems fail because of the increased distance between the representative and their territorial responsibilities especially in developing countries where access and locale are paramount in achieving democratic gains (Barkan J. 1995). Once again we clearly see that electoral democracy does not guarantee representation. If representation is a factor in achieving answerability, electoral democracy fails to meet the standards demanded for accountability.

This dilemma is compounded as elite bargains and elite capture can limit accountability – where despite electoral contestation, entrenched power cleavages are reconfirmed. “Regular multiparty elections may in fact be artificial exercises, that offer few meaningful choices to votes but that periodically legitimate hardline rulers. Elections may coexist, for instance, with systematic abuses of human rights or the disenfranchisement of large segments of the population”. Elite capture can take place through the lens of political associations, networks or parties. In Africa, the existence of parties merely denotes the “longevity of informal personal and lineage-based clientelist networks”. This again reconfirms the status quo as “regular multiparty elections will change the form in which political actors pursue control of the state apparatus and its resources but not the logic of their behaviour. Mechanisms of accountability and transparency will continue to be thwarted, while widespread clientelism, corruption, and patronage will undermine citizens’ confidence in democratic institutions, leading to instability and the possibility of a return to more overt forms of authoritarian rule” (Bratton et al 1997).

Careful thought must now be given to idea of the distribution of power itself. Whilst one may vote centrally or for a party, regional votes create differences depending on the balance of power and in particular the political scope of the elected or the jurisdiction. Whether a democratic system is centralised or decentralised has a great impact on accountability. This is overlooked by presidential or parliamentary democratic systems or “where there is a fragmented party system” it is possible to see that they are “lacking clear lines of accountability” (Luckham et al 2004).

Agere argues that decentralisation of power and information can act to enhance accountability. But the extent of accountable behaviour within decentralised structures is a function of the autonomy of the district and local governments. “Electoral mandates can only meaningfully enhance accountability when citizens use the power of the vote in an enlightened and discriminating manner: to reward good performers and to sanction poor performers. The key issue here is the education of the public, the civic education that enables the average citizen to link his/her vote to the demand for accountability”. Although he says that decentralized structures of accountability enhance enforcement, we must bear in mind that the institutions themselves are not borne of electoral democracy. An example of this can be found in Botswana, Ghana, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Here voting is devolved by way of local elections but the “overall impact” is limited as the real decisions are made centrally. These local districts are also constrained by inadequate resources (Agere 2000).

Electoral democracies: horizontal accountability and the promises of liberalism

O’Donnell complains that the “pervasive modern tendency to identify “democracy” (i.e. polyarchy) with elections has obscured the no less constitutive roles played by liberalism and republicanism”. Failure to recognise the roles that republicanism and liberalism play (which indeed are the “mainstay”) in mapping horizontal accountability creates serious difficulties (O’Donnell 1998).

Elected officials if operating in an electoral democracy need not pay heed to the safeguards which Huntington describes as characteristic of liberal systems. He cites Iran as a system which “combines contested elections and some checks and balances with fundamentalist repression and gross violations of individual rights”. India, Turkey and Sri Lanka “have been electoral democracies for almost half a century, yet they still remain deficient in the extent to which they protect the rights and liberties of their citizens”. In “those few democracies that …exist in the Muslim world, the rulers often rule in undemocratic fashion and show little interest in moving from electoral democracy to liberal democracy”. (Huntington 1998). In such regimes, “elected officials govern through direct populist appeals and resort to extensive use of patronage and clientelism, in the process undermining the judiciary, the legislature and the institutions of civil and political societies. Indeed, over time, unchecked executive power may result in what O’Donnell calls the “slow death” of democratic institutions” (Bratton et al 1997).

It becomes clear that whilst voters can decide who governs for a set time, the electoral democracy system comes to resemble a “rubber-stamping” mechanism for an executive body which has little or no restraint. Crucially, whilst vertical accountability may be present, it is clear that horizontal accountability is not forthcoming from the electoral democratic system. In this regard, it is clear that electoral democracy is not a sufficient condition for genuine accountability.

“As long as the executive’s policies succeed, its freedom of action remains broad, all the more so when the ….public at large agree with a delegative conception of authority”. For the executive, “undermining horizontal accountability remains the dominant strategy”. Although electoral democracy seems to ignore the vice of “encroachment” where the executive acts without bounds, the demos still has the power of vetoing leaders and indirectly demanding “a high degree of transparency in political decision making”. This in turn “creates a climate in which corruption does not thrive” (Luckham et al 2004).

One real difference may exist between transitional electoral democracy and consolidated (liberal) democracy. In the former, “the penalty for poor performance may well be the end of democratic rule itself and a return authoritarianism”. The latter however, may mean that “economic grievances are expressed through the ballot box and can lead to the replacement of one elected government by another.” (Bratton et al 1997).

“Democracies have a range of institutions to enforce accountability measures, and to influence government in the long stretches between elections, by typically these are beyond the reach of the poor. The poor rarely have the means to prosecute their grievances through lobbying of politicians or through the legal system. It is particularly difficult for them to challenge corrupt practices, which are among the greatest obstacles to the efficient delivery of development resources, dramatically limiting the impact of anti-poverty programmes.” Luckham points to the range of mechanisms or “institutional or procedural” choices which can ensure that citizens can demand accountability. Transparency in publications, tenders and monitoring exercises as well as public hearings facilitate the promotion of accountability. (Luckham et al 2004). It is essential to remember however, that all this is not necessarily the product of an electoral democracy, as once again there is no institutional framework for citizens which guarantee that these processes are in place. The mechanisms for answerability and “the prosecution of grievances” it seems, are increasingly drawn from liberal institutions and organisations such as ombudsman, regulatory bodies and NGOs, none of which automatically stem from electoral democracy.

Agere emphasises this when he depicts the political, administrative and financial accountability and the various instruments such as accurate and timely reporting on the utilisation of funds, the obligation to answer for the fulfilment of assigned and accepted duties within the framework of the authority and resources provided, auditing, and budgeting. These are used to capture “enforceability” and “answerability” but electoral democracies guarantee none of this. For example, the possibility of collusion between the elected and their bureaucratic counterparts may mean that little in the way of transparency is possible. Appointed administrators can weaken accountability as a result of possible collusion with the elected officials. He highlights the “ambiguous relationship between temporary political leaders and the permanent appointed officials. When they collude, accountability is unattainable”. Incidentally, he argues that this is a global phenomenon (Agere, 2000).

From this, it becomes increasingly difficult to situate accountability within electorally democratic regimes that need not adhere to liberal mechanisms or institutions which are essential for accountability. The deficiencies and shortcomings of electoral democracy reveal the extent to which though electoral democracy may be necessary, it falls short of being sufficient in providing hopes of genuine accountability.

Electoral democracies and scope:

It is possible to argue that the transitory and contested nature of democratic politics means that accountability becomes rather opaque. Indeed it may “undermine the political and macroeconomic stability required for growth” (Luckham et al 2004). Economic outcomes for example may be difficult to attribute to a regime which has only served one term of office. This is a key problem in locating responsibility for decisions. Which actions can be attributed to the elected and which belong to the global or external forces for instance? The matter of jurisdiction is important as the elected must have a framework of duty within which to operate. If there are no restrictions upon executive or legislative power, this is not necessarily automatic.

A final consideration is that the scope of power that international actors now have poses real questions for citizens in securing accountability (ibid). As multinationals, parastatal organisations and associations appropriate the discourse through globalisation, citizens find it increasingly difficult to locate mechanisms for redress and transparency. Chains of command and jurisdictions are increasingly obscured as the rapid pace of corporate politics dominates the political arena. Although many organisations and states are waking up to this, there is still much scope for accountability to do its work. Donor institutions such as the IMF or World Bank operate “with scant regard to the capacity of government to implement and win popular support for them” (ibid).

Electoral democracy it seems, when examined in isolation, does not deliver the promise of effective sanction or “enforceability”. Absence of voter choice, skewed electoral outcomes, lack of constitutional checks and balances, elite capture and other deficits can serve to conspire against the interests of the citizen. As a mechanism for answerability, it again falls short, as it does not contain guarantees of oversight and the clear demarcation of responsibility as is the promise of liberalism. As a condition for guaranteeing genuine accountability, it is clear that it must be coupled with other mechanisms to give citizens at last some measure of ownership over the control of global resources.

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